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INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING
TO ENSURE DRUG SAFETY AND
EFFICACY
MARC A. RODWIN*
I.

REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MANUFACTURER
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Drug manufacturers face a fundamental conflict of interest. Pursuit of
profit compromises drug manufacturers’ impartial assessment of the risks
and benefit of their drugs.1 Their biased evaluation can corrupt public
knowledge of drugs, lead to marketing unsafe and/or ineffective drugs, and
undermine rational physician prescribing.2 Over the last century, federal
regulation has mitigated, but not eliminated, this problem.3
Copyright © 2015 by Marc A. Rodwin.
* Marc A. Rodwin, J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Research on
this Article was funded by a grant from the Harvard University Edmond J. Safra Center Lab on
Institutional Corruption and a Suffolk University Law School Summer research fund. Thanks are
due to Patrick O’Leary for research on congressional hearings. This article is a revised version of
Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical Trials to Test Drugs: The Neglected Reform, 6 ST. LOUIS
U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113 (2012).
1. The conflicts of drug firms are, in part, conflicts of interest that affect medical practice in
general. See MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE
UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND JAPAN (Oxford University Press, 2011); MARC A. RODWIN,
MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (Oxford University
Press, 1993). For application of conflict of interest analysis in the pharmaceutical sectors, see
Karine Morin et al., Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287
JOURNAL AM. MED. ASS’N 78, 80 (2002) (focusing on conflicts specifically between
pharmaceutical companies and the testing of new drugs).
2. See Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An
Agenda for Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511–12 (2012); Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out
Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate Off-label Use, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654
(2013); see also, Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (2000) (highlighting several
instances in which researchers have been more willing to promote a drug or claim that it was
effective if they were funded by pharmaceutical companies).
3. See e.g., Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, 770
(1906) (repealed 1938) (representing the first major piece of reform). There is growing literature
analyzing problems with drug safety and current practices in pharmaceutical industry research and
marketing. See generally JOHN ABRAMSON, OVERDO$ED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF
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Several policies counter this conflict of interest.4 Nevertheless, when
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) considers whether to approve
sale of a drug, it relies upon clinical trials designed and controlled by the
drug sponsor.5 An ample record reveals that drug firms can design clinical
trials in ways that bias the conclusions,6 can misinterpret or misreport the
trial data, or can engage in fraud.7
AMERICAN MEDICINE (HarperCollins, 2004); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG
COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (paperback ed. 2005); JERRY
AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
(Knopf, 2004); HOWARD BRODY, HOOKED: ETHICS, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800
MILLION DOLLAR PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS (University of California
Press, 2004); DAVID HEALY, PHARMAGEDDON (University of California Press, 2012); DONALD
W. LIGHT, THE RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Columbia University Press, 2010); THOMAS J.
MOORE, PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER: THE HIDDEN DANGERS IN YOUR MEDICINE CABINET
(Simon & Schuster, 1998); RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE
WORLD'S BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS
(Nation Books, 2005); Marc-André Gagnon, Corporate Influence Over Clinical Research:
Considering the Alternatives, 21 PRESCRIRE INT’L 191, 191–95 (2012) (comparing clinical
research to a promotional campaign); Joel Lexchin, The Medical Profession and the
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Unhealthy Alliance, 18 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 603, 603–16
(1988) (highlighting how this problem is not just limited to the American medical industry by
discussing the conflict between the Canadian Medical Association and the pharmaceutical
industry); Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped
Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLOS MED. 1429, 1429–33 (2007)
(suggesting that drug companies often conduct and write studies and then pay academics to put
their names on it very late in the process); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 1,
2006
12:00
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/04/the-drugpushers/304714/ (describing the conflict created by pharmaceutical reps influencing doctors’
prescribing habits). Contra RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE REGULATION
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (Yale University Press, 2006) (arguing that that the
United States over-regulates the pharmaceutical industry).
4. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 54.1 (2013) (requiring clinicians involved in pharmaceutical
research to disclose all financial connections to the sponsoring company, including payments and
patents to try to reduce bias caused by financial ties); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E9 STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
CLINICAL
TRIALS
(1998),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm0
73137.pdf (detailing industry guidelines dedicated to reducing statistical bias or manipulation in
research studies by pharmaceutical companies).
5. See Kristin Rising et al., Reporting Bias in Drug Trails Submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration: Review of Publication and Presentation, 5 PLOS MED. 1561, 1567–68 (2008)
(showing how common it is for drug trails to be manipulated or biased when run by drug
companies).
6. See Marcia Angell, Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A Broken System, 300 JAMA
1069, 1069–71 (2008) (recalling particular issues when the drug company, Merck, had their own
paid employees write studies regarding the effectiveness of one of their products, a practice that
has also occurred at other companies); Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, A Model for
Dissemination and Independent Analysis of Industry Data, 306 JAMA 1593, 1593 (2011) (noting
that public confidence in research had been shaken when companies have been shown to
intentionally manipulate clinical research trials); Drummond Rennie, When Evidence Isn’t: Trials,
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Manufacturer bias can slant research when it is performed either inhouse, or when manufacturers finance or manage external researchers.8
Today, drug firms typically rely mainly on external researchers,9 using
Contract Research Organizations (“CROs”), or university-based researchers
to carry out clinical trials and/or to perform some or all of the analysis.10
Drug firms may also contract with specialists to design trials.11 The
corrupting influence persists because the drug sponsor chooses who will
conduct the trials, and these researchers depend on the sponsor for their
income;12 additionally, researchers report to the drug sponsor, not to the
FDA.13 Researchers, therefore, have incentives to advance the goals of the
drug sponsor and to follow the drug sponsor’s directives.14
This Article explores a proposal that would preclude biased drug
testing by removing all drug sponsor influence on the design and conduct of
clinical trials for new drug applications (“NDAs”), a reform that would
address the root of institutional corruption.15 Recently advocated by leading
Drug Companies and the FDA, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 991, 998 (2007) (describing documented
instances of physicians conducting studies on behalf of drug companies and intentionally
administering competing drugs incorrectly to make the studied drug look more effective, or
manipulating statistical analyses to show robust positive results).
7. See, e.g., Rennie, supra note 6, at 995–96 (recounting a time when the author, as an editor
of a major medical journal, realized that two authors had published dramatically conflicting results
in different journals at the same time).
8. See Angell, supra note 6 (discussing how Contract Research Organizations (“CROs”) are
susceptible to bias by allowing manufactures near total control of study design and execution
because drug companies are their only clients).
9. See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 1539–40 (2000) (observing how drug companies
increasingly rely on CROs and site-management organizations (“SMOs”) to conduct research
instead of traditional academic institutions).
10. Id.
11. Id. (describing how companies will have an external investigator design the trial if they
lack internal personnel with the needed expertise, or will design the trial in-house and then submit
it to investigators for review).
12. See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research, 289 JAMA 454, 463 (2003) (discussing possible links between researchers
in the biomedical field who are funded by drug sponsors and then achieve positive results in
studies).
13. See Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to
Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 754 (2009) (observing that drug companies often
include confidentiality clauses in contracts made with external researchers to prevent public or
even private discussion of results).
14. See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 1543 (noting that the pharmaceutical companies who
provide all or some of a researcher’s financial support use the money as leverage when being
presented with potentially unfavorable results).
15. The concept of institutional corruption has been developed by Lawrence Lessig and
Dennis Thompson. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 231–34 (2011) (defining institutional corruption using
examples from various governments around the world); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN
CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 37–43 (1995) (using the example
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scholars, the idea has a long history, yet was neglected for over half a
century due to pharmaceutical industry opposition.
A.

The Origins of Contemporary Pharmaceutical Regulation

Before examining the oversight of clinical trials, let us briefly review
the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry over the last century. In the
beginning of the twentieth century, the drug market was premised on the
doctrine of laissez-faire.16 Manufacturers did not have to test their drugs or
disclose the ingredients, could make any therapeutic claim, and could sell
any product directly to consumers.17
Reformers and muckrakers—supported by the American Medical
Association (“AMA”)—spearheaded the fight for federal drug
regulations.18 In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, which
required manufacturers to disclose therapeutic ingredients on the drug label,
and prohibited the sale of adulterated, misbranded, or deleterious
products.19 The law presumed that, with accurate labeling, individuals

of five senators known as “The Keating Five” to describe institutional corruption); Dennis F.
Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1036 (2005) (developing additional insight into institutional corruption in the
political sphere via campaign laws). For a review of institutional corruption and the
pharmaceutical industry, see the special issue (Volume 41, Issue 3) of the Journal of Law,
Medicine and Ethics devoted to the Institutional Corruption and Pharmaceutical Industry.
Symposium, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
544 (2012). For discussion of institutional corruption, see generally The Lab at Edmond J. Safra
Center for Ethics, HARVARD UNIV., http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab (last visited Oct. 26,
2014), which details the work of several researchers who are analyzing institutional corruption in
the pharmaceutical economy and other areas of public life.
16. See HARRY F. DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR MAN: THE DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, AND
USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 187–212, 230–32 (1970) (discussing the history of food and drug
law, and the Food and Drug Administration); PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH:
THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 11–94 (2003) (containing an
overview of the history of Dr. Wiley, who developed the FDA); PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR
MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1980) (illustrating that at the start of
the 20th century, patients could go directly to the pharmacy to buy drugs without a prescription,
and pharmacists could promote wares they chose to sell).
17. See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1759 (1996) (noting that drug manufacturers in the early 20th
century could claim that their product or an ingredient in it could cure cancer, even if there was no
supporting evidence).
18. See DOWLING, supra note 16, at 155–56; see also HILTS, supra note 16, at 52 (describing
how the American Medical Association forced congressional action by threatening their members’
lobbying of the Senate if a bill was not passed).
19. Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, 770 (1906)
(repealed 1938). See also Merrill, supra note 17, at 1758 (reviewing the content of the Pure Food
and Drug Act and discussing its impact in court cases).
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could safely choose drugs.20 Advertising of therapeutic claims remained
unregulated until the Shirley amendments in 1912 prohibited false and
fraudulent statements regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of drugs.21
Industry opposition blocked enactment of the Roosevelt
administration’s 1933 bill to regulate drugs until a scandal in 1937. In
order to improve the flavor of a sulfa-based drug called sulfanilamide, the
Massengill Company added a chemical that was toxic, causing the rapid
death of 106 people who had ingested the drug.22 Congress then passed the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”), which required drug
firms to seek FDA permission to market drugs, and which allowed the FDA
60 days to deny authorization if it found that the drug was dangerous or
improperly labeled.23
Manufacturers then had incentives to conduct research and to evaluate
their products.24 The marketing of Thalidomide led to the birth of children
with severe deformations in multiple countries, and created pressure for
stronger regulation.25 The 1962 amendments to the FDCA prohibited
marketing of drugs unless the FDA granted approval, and the amendments
removed the 60 day deadline for FDA review of new drugs.26 The
amendments required drug sponsors to demonstrate that drugs are
effective—not only safe—for a designated use.27 It also authorizes the FDA
to withdraw its approval for drugs already on the market based on new
evidence.28 Manufacturers are required to track drug distribution to
facilitate recalls of unsafe products, and to follow FDA standards for good
manufacturing practices.29 The law restricts promotion of drugs to

20. See TEMIN, supra note 16, at 4 (recalling that most consumers at the turn of the century
chose drugs for themselves as opposed to a doctor choosing for them, so ensuring consumers
knew what they were selecting and purchasing was a priority).
21. Pure Food Act Amendment of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416, 416–17 (1912).
22. See TEMIN, supra note 16, at 40–42 (providing more detail on the sulfanilamide scandal
and how it was used to gain political support for drug regulation reform).
23. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052
(1938).
24. The 1938 Act did not require firms to show that their drugs were effective. See Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505 (requiring evaluation of whether a drug is safe for use, but
not requiring evidence that it is effective).
25. TEMIN, supra note 16, at 123–24.
26. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 104, 76 Stat. 780, 784 (1962)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)). For a history and analysis of the legislation,
including how its development was impacted by tragic events, see Jerry Avorn, Learning about
the Safety of Drugs—A Half-Century of Evolution, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 2151, 2151–53 (2011);
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1764–65.
27. Drug Amendments of 1962 § 102(a)–(c) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C. (2006)).
28. Id. § 102(d).
29. Id. §§ 101, 103.
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therapeutic uses approved by the FDA.30 Promotional materials must note
risks, as well as benefits, and summarize side effects and
contraindications.31 The FDA specifies what information the label must
include, and labels must state the generic name, as well as the brand
name.32
In 1970, the FDA promulgated regulations that set standards for the
evidence that manufacturers would have to submit in order to demonstrate
that new drugs were safe and effective.33 Since then, testing of drugs follow
set stages.34 After researchers have identified a potentially therapeutic
molecule, they test its effects in laboratories on chemicals, cells, or
tissues.35 The FDA then requires firms to test its drugs for toxicity on
animals.36 Drug candidates that have not been ruled out due to toxicity or
lack of efficacy can then be tested on humans in three phases.37
In Phase I, researchers test the drug on a small number of human
subjects only to determine whether it is toxic in humans, and if so, at what
doses.38 Phase II testing consists of a clinical trial in a larger group of
patients in order to measure its benefits and risks.39 Drugs that are not
highly toxic are tested in Phase III clinical trials on a large number of
human research subjects, and researchers then compare its effect with a
control group.40 Typically, the control group uses a placebo or an

30. See Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Medical Devices, News & Events, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (statement of William B. Schultz, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, FDA (Feb. 22,
1996)), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115098.htm (last updated Aug. 6, 2009).
31. Drug Amendments of 1962 § 131(a).
32. Id. §§ 112, 131.
33. See Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (providing a brief historical overview of legislative developments
during the 1960s and 1970s and their corresponding impact on clinical drug trials).
34. See RICHARD E. ROWBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30913, PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS 4–5 (2001)
(discussing the phases of drug research).
35. For a description and history of the process used for drug development and testing drugs,
see SUSAN ALDRIDGE, MAGIC MOLECULES: HOW DRUGS WORK (Cambridge University Press,
1998) and JÜRGEN DREWS, IN QUEST OF TOMORROW’S MEDICINES (Springer-Verlag, 2003).
36. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 8 (describing how animal testing provides information
on the immediate impact of the drug, long term effects, and even how the drug might impact
pregnancy).
37. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2014).
38. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 9 (explaining how Phase I consists of 10 to 100 humans,
and determining what range of dose concentrations do not produce unacceptable side effects). See
also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (detailing Phase I of an investigation).
39. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 10 (explaining how Phase II trials include 50 to 500
humans to determine the effectiveness a drug). See also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (explaining Phase
II of an investigation).
40. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 10–11; 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
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alternative therapy.41 Human subjects are randomly assigned to either the
test group or the control group.42 It is a double blind study, which means
that the medication must be coded so that neither the physician who
administers the drug, nor the individual taking the drug, knows which
individuals receive the test drug and which individuals receive the placebo
(or the standard therapy to which it is compared) until the code is broken
after collection of data.43 To counter the risk of fraud or unreliable studies,
regulations establish standards for research methods, record keeping, and
data reporting.44 The FDA also inspects toxicological laboratories and
facilities that conduct clinical trials in order to monitor compliance.45
B.

Options for Control of Clinical Trials

There are six options for addressing conflicts of interest in clinical
trials, which are displayed in Table 1 below. At one extreme, the drug
sponsor has complete control over clinical trials; at the other extreme, the
federal government conducts the clinical trials. Between these two poles are
four strategies that can be used individually or combined. The FDA relies
mainly on the second strategy, which has been supplemented in recent years
by the fourth strategy.

41. ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 10.
42. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION &
RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E10 CHOICE OF CONTROL GROUP
AND
RELATED
ISSUES
IN
CLINICAL
TRIALS
3
(2001),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/uc
m073139.pdf.
43. See id. at 4 (explaining that the purpose of double blind studies is to minimize biases).
44. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.57, 314.126 (2010) (addressing recordkeeping, and adequate and
well-controlled studies).
45. See OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7 (1981), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/EnforcementActions/BioresearchMonitoring/UCM133748.
pdf; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFORMATION SHEET
GUIDANCE FOR IRBS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND SPONSORS: FDA INSPECTIONS OF
CLINICAL
INVESTIGATORS
3
(2010),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126553.pdf.
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TABLE 1: S TRATEGIES TO ADDRESS DRUG SPONSOR
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL TRIALS

←Manufacturer Control
1
2
3

4

Government Control→
5
6

Drug firms

FDA

Government

Government

Government

Government

conduct

regulates

or private

promotes

selects

agency

clinical

and

entity

transparency

independent

conducts

trials with

oversees

certifies

by requiring:

entities to

clinical trials

little

clinical

clinical

(1)

conduct

regulation

trials that

researchers.

registration of

clinical trials

drug firms

Drug firms

trials;

conduct

conduct

(2) disclosure

clinical trials

of clinical

using

study

certified

reports; or

researchers

(3) disclosure
of patient
level data

The first option ignores the conflict of interest in allowing drug firms
to oversee their own research, and permits the drug firm to conduct clinical
trials without any oversight.46 The second strategy has the FDA regulate
clinical trials that are conducted by drug firms, using standards for
research.47 The third strategy requires that only certified research
organizations and researchers conduct clinical trials.48 The fourth strategy
promotes transparency of drug firm-sponsored research (since 2007, the
United States has required registration of clinical trials to promote
transparency49).50 The fifth strategy precludes drug firm bias by having the
46. See supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text (explaining the conflict of interest in
allowing drug firms to oversee their own research).
47. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining that this is the strategy that the FDA
has taken).
48. See N.Y. Acad. of Med. Comm. on Pub. Health, The Importance of Clinical Testing in
Determining the Efficacy and Safety of Drugs, 38 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 415, 420, 429 (1962)
(explaining how there is no requirement for a tester to certify his professional qualifications, and
articulating the need for establishing professional standards).
49. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, §
801(j)(2)(C), 121 Stat. 823, 907–08. The push for registration of clinical trials emerged after
studies showed the presence of biased information in published literature evaluating drugs. See
An-Wen Chan et al., Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in Randomized
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federal government select independent researchers to design and conduct
clinical trials.51 The sixth strategy mandates that the government agency
conduct clinical trials.
Until now, almost all regulations have employed the second strategy
by setting technical standards for laboratory testing and clinical trials.52
This strategy, however, could be further developed in new ways.53 For
example, regulations could oversee financial relations between the drug

Trials: Comparison of Protocols to Published Articles, 291 JAMA 2457, 2457–65 (2004)
(explaining how drug firms published studies showing positive results but buried studies that show
drugs’ ineffectiveness or high risks, causing medical journal editors to promote clinical trial
registration to increase access to data). In 2004, the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors agreed that their journals would not publish clinical trial results unless the trial was
registered before patients enrolled. Catherine DeAngelis et al., Editorial, Clinical Trial
Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250–51 (2004). The Committee of Editors decided that registries should
include data specified by the World Health Organization (“WHO”). See WHO Trial Registration
Data Set, International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (“ICTRP”), WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/ictrp/network/trds/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2014)
(setting forth the minimum amount of trial information required to appear for a trial to be
considered fully registered by the WHO).
Current law requires registering certain trials on the ClinicalTrials.gov website if the trial is part of
an FDA investigation of a new drug application, or if there is a trial site in the U.S. In addition,
researchers must post key results within a year after collecting data. Researchers have up to three
years, however, to post results for studies of off-label drug uses (i.e., uses other than those the
FDA has approved). See Michael R. Law et al., Despite Law, Fewer than One in Eight Completed
Studies of Drugs and Biologics are Reported on Time on ClinicalTrials.gov, 30 HEALTH AFF.
2338, 2338–39 (2011) (stating that while the federal government mandates that clinical trials be
registered, researchers are permitted to a three year delay). Nevertheless, registration practice
falls short of what the law requires. See id. (finding that 39% of trials were registered late, while
only 12% of completed studies registered their results within the year); Sylvain Mathieu et al.,
Comparison of Registered and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized Controlled Trials,
302 JAMA 977, 977 (2009) (stating that registration requirements typically were ignored, and
were the exception to the rule rather than the norm). Moreover, current law and policy impedes
access to information on drug safety. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality
Laws and Secrecy in Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety, 26
HEALTH AFF. 483, 487 (2007) (explaining how current law and policy impedes access to
information on drug safety).
50. See Galbraith, supra note 13, at 768 (2009) (describing how increased transparency would
help increase public trust and interest); Ida Sim et al., Comment, Clinical Trial Registration:
Transparency is the Watchword, 367 LANCET 1631, 1631 (2006) (“Transparency [of clinical
trials] is the best antidote to such free-floating distrust.”).
51. See Rennie, supra note 6, at 1010 (arguing for a separate and independent entity of
researchers to engage in trials, who would be prohibited from receiving funds from
pharmaceutical companies as a way to preclude drug firm bias).
52. See Galbraith, supra note 13, at 713–14 (2009) (explaining the FDA’s role in setting the
prerequisites that pharmaceutical companies must substantiate in claiming that a drug is safe and
effective); Rennie, supra note 6, at 1003 (2007) (describing the role of the FDA and the standards
for trials).
53. See infra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
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sponsor and researchers.54 Regulations could also preclude individuals and
firms from conducting a clinical trial if either have significant financial
conflicts of interest.55
Some reformers in the 1960s and 1970s advocated for certification of
researchers (the third strategy),56 but the United States has not pursued this
approach.57 Regulations could authorize the federal government or private
organizations to certify researchers, and to require that only certified
researchers and organizations conduct drug trials used to support NDAs.58
To strengthen the transparency strategy, regulations could require that
drug sponsors and their researchers make the clinical study report public
(which drug firms currently only supply to the FDA) in order to comply
with the FDA rules and international standards.59 Clinical study reports
contain key information related to the clinical trial, including: the study
protocol, the designated clinical end points, discussion of methods and
statistical analysis, tabulated data, and analysis of data.60 Regulations could
also require disclosure of clinical trial patient level data.61 Making detailed

54. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND
INTERESTS IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS: GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN SUBJECT
PROTECTION
5–6
(2004),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/humansubjects/finreltn/fguid.pdf (raising points to consider
when determining whether specific financial interests in research affect human subjects’ rights
and welfare, and which approaches should subsequently be taken to protect those subjects).
55. See id. (explaining how conflicts of interest may be managed by eliminating or mitigating
financial interests).
56. See N.Y. Acad. of Med. Comm. on Pub. Health, supra note 48, at 433–34 (urging that
clinical testing be formally recognized as a medical specialty, and noting specific requirements for
certification).
57. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 312.70 (2014) (describing the selection process of investigators
and monitors). There is still no guidance on the certification of researchers, but the FDA can bar
researchers from conducting clinical trials used to support new drug applications. Id.
58. See Rennie, supra note 6, at 1010.
59. See Guideline for Industry: Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports, 61 Fed. Reg.
37,320, 37,322 (July 17, 1996) (stating that currently, requirements for data presentation vary
widely); Peter Doshi et al., The Imperative to Share Clinical Study Reports: Recommendations
from the Tamiflu Experience, 10 PLOS MED. 1, 2 (2012) (explaining how the European Medicines
Agency has recently started to make clinical trial reports available when they are requested under
public disclosure statutes); Marc A. Rodwin & John D. Abramson, Clinical Trial Data as a Public
Good, 308 JAMA 871, 871 (2012) (indicating that John Abramson and I have called for
legislation to require mandatory disclosure of clinical study reports for FDA approved drugs);
Press Release, European Meds. Agency, Medicines Agency Widens Public Access to Documents
(Nov.
30,
2010)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Press_release/2010/11/WC500099468.
pdf.
60. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801, 121
Stat. 823, 904–22 (2007).
61. See Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, A Model for Dissemination and Independent
Analysis of Industry Data, 306 JAMA 1593, 1594 (2011) (stating that a complete release of
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information public on clinical trials would allow independent researchers to
review the analysis, or to perform their own evaluation. Proponents of this
approach say that it would make it harder for drug sponsors to hide risks
from the public, and that it would also help to hold the FDA accountable for
its decisions.62
New regulations that advanced the second, third, and fourth strategies
would not remove the drug sponsor bias. Consequently, some critics have
proposed ending the drug sponsor’s control over clinical trials that the FDA
uses to evaluate drugs.63 This reform can be implemented through the fifth
strategy (having the federal government contract with independent
organizations to design and conduct clinical trials), or through the sixth
strategy (having the federal government conduct the clinical trials). Under
most formulations of these proposals, the drug sponsor would finance the
drug testing, just as they currently do. Some proposals, however, would
have the pharmaceutical industry collectively finance the testing; others
propose that the federal government share the costs of drug testing with the
pharmaceutical industry collectively, or with the drug sponsor.64
C.

Contemporary Proposals for Independent Drug Testing

In the last two decades, several authors have called for independent
drug testing. These proposals are supported by scholarly literature that
documents publication bias as well as biased research design in drug
company-controlled trials.65 In 2004, Dr. Marcia Angell proposed the
patient-level data addresses industry and societal concerns, and that the “way forward” is to
disclose clinical trial patient level data).
62. See id. at 1593–94 (proposing a model that emphasizes independence, transparency,
fairness, and reproducibility, which would allow for the release and review of findings, and further
instill confidence in the public that efforts are not being manipulated by funding or coordinating
organizations).
63. See Sheldon Krimsky, Publication Bias, Data Ownership, and the Funding Effect in
Science: Threats to the Integrity of Biomedical Research, RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS:
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 61, 81 (Wendy Wagner & Rena
Steinzor eds., 2006) (proposing an independent institute that would contract with independent
researchers and would not be controlled by the sponsoring company); Catherine D. DeAngelis,
Conflict of Interest and the Public Trust, 284 JAMA 2237, 2238 (2000) (“When an investigator
has a financial interest in or funding by a company with activities related to his or her research, the
research is lower in quality, [and is] more likely to favor the sponsor’s product . . . .”).
64. See infra Parts II, III (discussing contemporary proposals).
65. See Lisa Bero & Drummond Rennie, Influences on the Quality of Published Drug Studies,
12 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 209, 211 (1996) (stating that the most serious
threat to the quality of drugs arise out of systematic bias introduced during the research process);
Peter C. Gøtzsche, Methodology and Overt and Hidden Bias in Reports of 196 Double-Blind
Trials of Nonsteroidal Antiinflammatory Drugs in Rheumatoid Arthritis, 10 CONTROLLED
CLINICAL TRIALS 31, 51 (1989) (finding that hidden biases, which are difficult to detect, and overt
biases existed in the design of clinical studies); P.C. Waller et al., Review of Company
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creation of an Institute for Prescription Drug Trials within the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) that would oversee the clinical trials.66 This
proposal projected that the NIH would carry out the research through
independent researchers at universities.67 The data would belong to the
institute and the researchers, and the results would be public.68 The FDA
would then rely on these studies to decide whether or not to authorize the
marketing of the drug.69 To fund the institute, drug firms would be assessed
a percentage of their gross revenues.70
In 1993, Doctors Wayne Ray, Marie Griffin, and Jerry Avorn
proposed creating a governmental center that would assess drug
effectiveness and compare the costs and benefits of alternative drug
therapies.71 The center would fund and/or conduct studies of drugs already
approved for sale, and coordinate drug research performed by government
agencies.72 The authors would finance the center through a tax on drug
sales and third-party payer subscription fees.73
In 1996, Doctors Lisa Bero and Drummond Rennie advocated for
legislation that would support independent studies of drug cost
effectiveness and comparative effectiveness that would be funded by a user
fee on pharmaceutical firms.74 In 2007, Dr. Rennie argued that the United
States should create a federally financed National Institute of Clinical
Trials.75 This institute would decide what trials to conduct and would make
Postmarketing Surveillance Studies, 304 BRIT. MED. J. 1470, 1470–71 (1992) (arguing that postmarketing studies have made a limited contribution to the assessment of drug safety overall).
66. ANGELL, supra note 3, at 244–45 (paperback ed. 2005).
67. Id. at 245.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 245–46 (explaining that the Institute for Prescription Drug Trials would oversee
clinical trials before FDA approval, rather than after).
70. Id. at 245. Dr. Angell summarizes problems with industry sponsored clinical trials. See
generally Angell, supra note 6, at 1070 (discussing conflicts of interest that exist within industry
sponsored drug research). For a review of problems with industry funded trials, see Thomas
Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1539 (2000).
71. Wayne A. Ray et al., Sounding Board: Evaluating Drugs After Their Approval for
Clinical Use, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2031 (1993). Their proposal incorporated parts of the
FDCA amendments proposed in 1974 and 1978, the Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use’s
1980 recommendations, and Senator David Pryor’s proposed Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent
Purchasing Act of 1990. Id. at 1031.
72. Id. at 2030–31.
73. Id. at 2031.
74. Bero & Rennie, supra note 65, at 229. Several other physicians have called for increasing
funding for clinical trials to improve pharmaceutical policy and clinical care. See Alastair J.J.
Wood et al., Sounding Board: Making Medicines Safer—The Need for an Independent Drug
Safety Board, 339 NEW ENG. MED. J. 1851, 1852 (1998) (proposing the creation of an
independent drug safety board to evaluate drugs).
75. Rennie, supra note 6, at 1009–11.
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grants to researchers.76 Researchers would receive all of their funds through
their institutions and would not be allowed to receive other funds.77
A group of scholars interested in public goods and intellectual property
have also called for publicly funded clinical trials to ensure unbiased
evaluation, and to reduce the cost of drug development.78 They argue that if
clinical trials were publicly funded, it would be unnecessary to grant patents
or exclusive marketing periods to drug firms—at the very least, we could
shorten the duration of the monopoly.79 Additionally, these scholars note
that lower prices would increase access to pharmaceuticals globally.80
Most contemporary proponents of independent testing, however, are
either not aware, or have forgotten, that Congress considered similar
proposals between the late 1950s and 1980.81

76. Id. at 1010–11.
77. Id. (arguing that such a system would allow for greater credibility).
78. See e.g., Tracy R. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of
Clinical Trials, THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Jan. 2007, at 1, 1–4 (arguing that independent drug
testing conducted by the federal government would eliminate a conflict of interest, which exists
between the drug manufacturers and drug testers).
79. See James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines,
18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 162–63 (2009) (stating that prizes could be a viable alternative to
granted exclusive rights); Tracy R. Lewis et al., Treating Clinical Trials as a Public Good: The
Most Logical Reform 3 (Sept. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of
California
Berkeley
Law
and
Economics
Workshop),
available
at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3cn7258n (arguing that the elimination of drug production
monopolies would benefit both health care providers and customers in terms of cost).
80. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 79, at 171–72 (stating that a drug price decrease of 95%
to 99% is feasible if greater competition were allowed in the development of medicines, allowing
for greater access to drugs, especially those used to treat serious conditions); James Love & Tim
Hubbard, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 147, 150
(2004) (arguing that greater competition in drug research and development will allow for new
medical inventions at marginal costs, allowing resources to be allocated to those areas with the
greatest needs); Comment to the World Health Org. Intergovernmental Working Grp. on Pub.
Health, Innovation & Intellectual Prop., James Love, Knowledge Ecology Int’l (Sept. 30, 2007)
(on
file
with
the
World
Health
Org.),
available
at
http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/second/contributions_section2/Section2_JamesLoveKEI_prizes.pdf (eliminating market exclusivity for prescription drugs would create greater supply
and access to medical devices and products, and could have a dramatic change on the global
market for pharmaceutical drugs).
81. See Administered Prices in the Drug Industry (Antibiotics), Part 24: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 13934–35
(1960) [hereinafter Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24] (indicating that Senator Kefauver had
introduced the bill calling for drug testing to be conducted by the FDA); Competitive Problems in
the Drug Industry, Parts 1–34: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 90–96th Congress (1967–79); Interagency Coordination in Drug Research
and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Reorganization & Int’l Orgs. of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 88th Cong. 790 (1963)
[hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3]; Preclinical and Clinical Testing by
the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 1: J. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm.
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THE STALLED REFORM: PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG
TESTING FROM 1959–1980

Between 1959 and 1980, Congress, the FDA, industry advocates, and
consumer advocates debated how drugs should be tested.82 Hearings
chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN), Hubert H. Humphrey (D-WI),
Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), and Ted Kennedy (D-MA) document their
views.83 The hearings revealed two main problems with relying on
manufacturer testing: (1) the economic incentives of drug firms
compromised their impartiality, biased the design of the clinical trials, and
sometimes led to fraud;84 and (2) testing laboratories and investigators
performed shoddy work because they lacked training, and cut corners to
boost income.85 By 1960, the FDA found that many NDAs were based on
poorly designed and implemented studies.86 FDA investigations and
congressional hearings revealed fraud by testing laboratories, physician
investigators, and drug firms, finding quality problems that compromised
the reliability of testing.87 The FDA developed regulations to address these
on Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975) [hereinafter Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1].
82. See, e.g., Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81; Drug Research &
Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 81; Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1,
supra note 81.
83. See sources cited supra note 81.
84. The FDA had noted problems with fraud, bias, and poor study design even before 1961.
See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study,
Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization & Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. on Gov’t
Operations, 87th Cong. 32 (1962) (statement of William S. Middleton, Chief Medical Director,
Veterans’ Administration); Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency
Coordination Study, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization & Int’l Org. of the
S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 87th Cong. 373, 375 (1962) [hereinafter Drug Research &
Regulation Hearings, Part 2] (statement of Mr. William Weiss, Bureau of Program Planning and
Appraisal, Food and Drug Administration).
85. See MORTON MINTZ, THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE: A REPORT ON THE ROLES OF THE
UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS, AND OTHERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE IRRATIONAL AND
MASSIVE USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS THAT MAY BE WORTHLESS, INJURIOUS, OR EVEN
LETHAL (Houghton Mifflin, 1965); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 105 (1984) (explaining that data could be fabricated both to meet
particular deadlines as well as to produce results that were favorable to the manufacturer);
MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS 137 (1974) (stating that
there are few research workers with both the competence and motivation to properly conduct
clinical tests).
86. See Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 81, at 782 (finding that
many new drugs did not have sufficient data to establish that the particular drug was both safe and
effective).
87. Id. at 792 (illustrating expert testimony that revealed that approved drugs had been
improperly investigated by investigators with questionable qualifications); see also Drug
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problems.88 The standards for drug testing became more rigorous and FDA
oversight increased, but congressional hearings revealed that many
problems still persisted.89
A.

1959–1961: The Kefauver Hearings and Other Proposals

Senator Estes Kefauver held hearings on the pharmaceutical industry
from 1959 to 1961.90 In testimony, Dr. Maxwell Finland, associate
professor at Harvard Medical School, proposed having the NIH set up study
sections to evaluate drugs.91 That way, as Dr. Finland notes, “the
endorsement of inferior products that are not in the best interest of the
public[ ] is much less likely to occur than when the support for testing the
product is furnished by the individual producer.”92 Dr. Finland also warned
of risks when university researchers depended on drug firm grants.93 He
said that “ . . . departments of clinical pharmacology[ ] should not
depend . . . on funds that come from individual drugs, because . . . some
people cannot perhaps divorce their judgment from the sources of their

Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 2, supra note 84, at 375 (describing how in one expert’s
opinion, unconscious bias rather than overt fraud provides the greatest opportunity for poor testing
of new drugs). These problems led many people to conclude that the federal government should
either test drugs or contract with independent parties to design and carry out the clinical trials. See
Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81, at 13933 (statement of Maxwell Finland,
Associate Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School) (noting that the National Institutes of
Health could oversee the testing of new drugs, ensuring a proper supply of materials and qualified
staff to conduct studies).
88. See, e.g., Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm (last
updated Mar. 25, 2014) (showing that in 1962, the FDA passed the Kefauver-Harris Drug
Amendments to ensure drug efficacy and greater safety).
89. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1, supra note 81, at 11–12 (discussing
issues in scientific data retrieval, which existed within the FDA).
90. The hearing initially focused on market competition, but after the Thalidomide disaster,
they focused on drug safety issues, including drug testing. See Administered Prices Hearing, Part
24, supra note 81, at 13609, 13943, 14041 (discussing the need for competent expert research into
whether drugs are safe for the general public). The hearings and recommendations were
summarized in SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST & MONOPOLY, ADMINISTERED PRICES: DRUGS, S.
REP. NO. 87-448, at 245 (1961). For an engaging popular account of the hearings on the
pharmaceutical industry chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver, see RICHARD HARRIS, THE REAL
VOICE (Macmillan 1964).
91. See Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81, at 13933 (explaining that the
National Institutes of Health would assign funds to testing centers with proper qualifications to
conduct clinical tests). Dr. Finland discusses this proposal and other issues in an article that
appeared while Senators Gaylord Nelson and Ted Kennedy were investigating the pharmaceutical
industry. See Maxwell Finland, Clinical Investigation of New Antimicrobial Agents, 120 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 620 (1969).
92. Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81, at 13933.
93. Id. at 13934.
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support.”94 Senator Kefauver added that “the efficacy of drugs should be
tested by the Food and Drug Administration.”95 Dr. Finland believed,
however, that it would be preferable to have an independent entity carry out
the study in order to avoid having an FDA scientist evaluate the agency’s
research.96
In 1960, Alek Rozental, an economics professor at Saint Louis
University, published “The Strange Ethics of the Ethical Pharmaceutical
Industry” in Harper’s Magazine.97 To ensure drug safety, Rozental wrote
that the United States should follow the 1959 proposal of the United
Kingdom’s Hinchliffe committee on drug safety and cost.98 Rozental
recommended that “all new drugs . . . be subject to independent clinical
trials preferably conducted by a central organization, to be financed by the
industry.”99
B.

1962–1963: The Humphrey Hearings

Senator Hubert Humphrey chaired hearings before the Subcommittee
on Reorganization and International Organizations from August of 1962
through 1964.100 The committee examined three key questions: (1) what
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Alek A. Rozental, The Strange Ethics of the Ethical Drug Industry, HARPER’S MAG.,
May 1960, at 73, 73 (discussing the need for reform of the drug industry to better serve doctors
and patients in light of the large profits drug companies were making at the time).
98. Id. at 84.
99. Id. Rozental suggested that another option that might generate less political opposition
would be to create an independent profession of clinical testers, akin to certified public
accountants serving as independent auditors. Id.
100. See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination
Study, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm.
on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation
Hearings, Part 1 (88th Cong.)]; Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation:
Agency Coordination Study, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l
Org. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug
Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 2 (88th Cong.)]; Interagency Coordination in Drug
Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong. (1963)
[hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3 (88th Cong.)]; Interagency
Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study, Part 4: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. on Governmental
Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th
Cong.)]; Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination
Study, Part 5: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm.
on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation
Hearings, Part 5 (88th Cong.)]. The Humphrey hearings began after the Kefauver hearings
(1959–1961), but before Congress passed the 1962 FDA amendments.
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role should the federal government play in testing drugs or setting standards
for drug testing; (2) which organizations should conduct clinical tests; and
(3) what qualifications should individuals have to conduct clinical trials?101
When the hearings began, the FDA had not yet developed regulations
specifying how drugs should be tested under the 1962 FDA amendments.102
The 1938 Food and Drug Act provided that manufacturers had to select
reliable investigators, specifying that these reliable investigators needed to
be experts qualified by scientific training.”103 The FDA declined to specify
criteria that qualified individuals as experts, explaining that it was not
authorized to control the practice of medicine.104
Prior to regulations in 1970, there was little distinction between
physicians and investigators.105 Drug firms would frequently give
investigational drugs to several practitioners to test on their patients.
Pharmaceutical firms would draw on their reports or testimonials when
submitting NDAs. The FDA recommended that specialists test the drugs in
the diseases for which that drug would be used, and that firms employ
several investigators, each of which would work independently in different
locations to ensure a balanced assessment.106 Drug testing, however, was
often not clearly separated from marketing.107 In 1960, Dr. Mendel C.
Sheps from the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine wrote that “the
scientific requirements for careful investigation . . . compete with highpressure marketing demands.”108 In fact, he continued, “the responsibility
for arranging . . . the first trials on human beings is at times given to detail
men.”109

101. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 1 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 57–58.
102. The FDA proposed regulations setting standards for conducting clinical trials in 1970.
Hearing Requests on Refusal or Withdrawal of New Drug Applications and Issuance, Amendment
or Repeal of Antibiotic Drug Regulations and Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and
Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 3073–74 (proposed Feb. 17, 1970) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 130, 146).
103. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1053
(1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2013).
104. N.Y. Acad. of Med. Comm. on Pub. Health, supra note 48, at 420.
105. See id. at 429 (noting that a physician “tacitly qualifies himself” as an investigator and
that there is limited oversight of a physician’s proper qualifications to be an investigator, thus
blurring the line between physician and investigator).
106. Id. at 420.
107. Drug Research & Regulations Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1590
(explaining that high-pressure marketing demands often influenced the clinical testing and
perceived worthiness of drugs).
108. Id. (explaining that clinical studies served a dual purpose: not only were they arranged to
gain scientific insight on the “clinical worthiness” of the said drug, but they also attempted to
promote the drug to the medical profession to gain their acceptance and support).
109. Id.

62

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 18:45

The hearing record included the New York Academy of Medicine’s
1962 report on drug testing, which found that many tests were substandard
because investigators lacked training or experience in designing studies, or
in recording and reporting results.110 The record noted that neither the
FDA, nor any other official or professional body, had set standards for
clinical investigators.111 The report recommended that investigators should
have training in clinical research, that pharmaceutical firms’ medical
directors should have experience in clinical testing, and that the research
should take place in hospitals.112
The report rejected two proposals, however, that would shift
responsibility from drug firms to the federal government. The first proposal
would establish a “national central office on testing . . . [that would] arrange
to conduct and supervise the testing of all products.”113 The report argued
that a national center would be overly bureaucratic, which would be
unacceptable to pharmaceutical manufacturers and clinicians.114 The
second proposal, modeled on the AMA Committee on Therapeutic Trials,
would establish a national referral agency for clinical investigators.115 The
report also did not support this idea due to the failure of the AMA’s earlier
testing plan.116
In 1963, Consumers Union, which had built its reputation as an
independent tester of consumer products, evaluated the 1962 FDA
amendments in its journal, Consumer Reports. Consumer Unions said that
the “fundamental question” is this: “is it good public policy to permit the
drug manufacturers to do or to supervise the clinical testing of their own
products?”117 Consumers Union argued that since the FDA relied on reports
“procured by the manufacturers,” the arrangement was an inadequate
substitute for “an objective testing agency.”118 In Senate testimony,
Consumers Union called for the creation of an independent government

110. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 2 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 528, 536.
111. Id. at 531. Note that professional organizations did ultimately consider establishing their
own guidelines. The American Society for Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, for
example, considered the question of whether qualifying boards should be established in clinical
pharmacology. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at
1607. The institution ultimately decided against it, however, concluding that a certification system
for scientists’ conduct of research had “no acceptable precedent.” Id.
112. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 2 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 539–40.
113. Id. at 538.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Drug Safety, CONSUMER REPS., Mar. 1963, at 134, 136.
118. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1052.
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agency to test drugs that would produce all of the data that the FDA would
use when deciding whether or not to approve new drugs for marketing.119
Dr. Charles May, professor of pediatrics at the New York University
School of Medicine, called for increased clinical testing by publicly funded
researchers.120 Dr. May proposed the creation of publicly funded,
autonomous drug testing centers located at medical-school-affiliatedhospitals,121 where the facilities and core staff would be publicly funded.122
In Dr. May’s proposal, the FDA or other agencies would provide grants for
individual research projects, and investigators would choose research
projects based on scientific merit.123
Several other physicians suggested that there should be a separation
between firms sponsoring a new drug and researchers testing the drug.124
One idea was to have the industry pool funds for testing new drugs.125
More frequently, physicians have proposed even greater separation.126 Dr.
George Baehr, Chair of the New York State Public Health Council,
proposed testing drugs only in FDA-approved trial centers located in
teaching hospitals.127 Dr. M. Harold Book of Kings Park State Hospital
wrote, “the preliminary testing on human patients . . . should be assigned to

119. Id.
120. Id. at 1034, 1053–54 (explaining that clinical testing should be conducted in New
Treatment Centers by publically funded researchers such as clinicians, pharmacologists, or any
specialists the studies required).
121. Dr. May summarized his ideas in a March 1963 memorandum and subsequent hearing
testimony. Id. at 1044–45, 1053–54 (explaining that his proposal would be to create new centers
for drug research in medical institutions, starting with a few, and expanding the program to other
facilities if the launching of the program is successful).
122. Id. at 1054.
123. Id. (explaining that the choice, control, and initiative of choosing research projects would
remain with the investigators who are supported by basic grants).
124. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1617–18,
1620, 1625–28, 1631–34, 1636, 1639 (highlighting a collection of correspondence from scientists
and other sources that suggest sponsors of drugs should be separate from those researching the
drugs).
125. Dr. Keith J.B. Wightman of the University of Toronto proposed that pharmaceutical
manufacturers create and collectively fund a foundation that would help design studies, identify
investigators and facilities, and publish the results. The president of the American Society for
Clinical Investigation supported a proposal to replace the practice of having individual drug firms
directly pay investigators; in its place, a board of impartial scientists and public and industry
representatives should disburse payments to drug testers from a common fund supported by
pharmaceutical firms. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 5 (88th Cong.), supra note
100, at 2419–20 (statement of Irving M. London, President, Am. Society for Clinical
Investigation).
126. See Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1617–
18, 1620, 1625–28, 1631–34, 1636, 1639 (addressing physicians’ proposals to conduct clinical
drug testing independent from manufacturer control).
127. Id. at 1641 (explaining that all drugs should be clinically tested in FDA-approved trial
centers located at teaching hospitals of medical schools before being released for sale).

64

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 18:45

some independent noncommercial agency and not to any individuals or
groups who are dependent . . . for financial support on pharmaceutical
houses.”128 Doctors I.H. Page and Ray W. Gifford, Jr. of the Cleveland
Clinic wrote that “an independent agency [should] be created to receive and
administer funds to pay the costs of drug testing.”129
During this period, there were numerous examples of fraud in
pharmaceutical firm-sponsored testing.130 In 1962, reports of harmful side
effects from the use of MER/29 (triparanol), a drug marketed to reduce
blood cholesterol, led the manufacturer, which was a subsidiary of
Richardson-Merrell, to stop selling the drug.131 Investigations later found
fraudulent reporting of the toxicological studies.132 Investigations by the
FDA and other federal agencies revealed fraudulent reporting of the
toxicological studies by university based researchers.133 There were also
reports of bias arising from drug company sponsorships of drug trials, and
the trade press reported on “rigging” of research.134 A 1963 New England
Journal of Medicine editorial criticized firms that set unethical publication
restrictions, specifically those who only permitted publication of positive
results.135
In the 1964 hearings, Senator Humphrey reported the views of
professionals on how drug firms’ payments to clinical investigators might
compromise their objectivity.136 Dr. Edward Adelson, of the George
Washington University School of Medicine, wrote that “an investigator
who depends on drug funds . . . knows that if he hopes to get further
grants[,] it would be better to obtain results proving [that] the drug . . . is a
good one.”137 Dr. George E. Schreiner, head of the American Federation

128. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 5 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 2285.
129. Id. at 2296.
130. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 51–54 (illustrating the problem of dishonesty in the
investigation of new drug usage through examples of fraudulent clinical trials).
131. Id. at 60 (emphasizing that this MER/29 case was one of the most shocking case of fraud
in the area of safety testing of drugs).
132. Id. at 62 (noting that Richardson-Merrell’s reports of a chronic toxicity study in monkeys
was fraudulent, and served as count three in the charges against them and the eventual downfall of
the MER/29 drug).
133. Id. at 58–59.
134. See Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 975–
76 (Exhibit 137, excerpt from Drug Trade News) (explaining that many drug testers test with
predetermined results to ensure a drug is permissible for consumption).
135. Regarding the Clinical Test, 268 NEW ENG. J. MED. 680, 680 (1963).
136. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1641–51
(Exhibit 206) (noting a variety of letters and comments from various medical professionals on
their personal experience with bias in the drug testing profession).
137. Id. at 1647.
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for Clinical Research, wrote “that when there is direct payment from drug
firms, there may be too much temptation to turn in a favorable report.”138
At the conclusion of the 1964 hearings, Senator Humphrey wrote a
memo to his colleagues that outlined reform options.139 In this memo,
Senator Humphrey described one option, which was to ask the
pharmaceutical industry to contribute funds to hire researchers who would
be “entirely independent of [the] industry [and would] perform preclinical
and clinical tests.”140 Another option, proposed by Dr. Harry Dowling, was
to grant the FDA funds “to finance the testing of a drug by an independent
agency . . . [when] the Administration was not satisfied with the evidence
submitted by the manufacturer of the drug.”141
The FDA was also worried about the quality of testing. Speaking
before the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association in 1966, FDA
Commissioner James L. Goddard stated that he was:
shocked at the materials that come in. In addition to the
problem of quality, there is the problem of dishonesty in
the investigational new drug stage [including] . . . the
conscious withholding of unfavorable animal clinical data
[and] . . . [t]he deliberate choice of clinical investigators
known to be more concerned about industry friendships
than in developing good data.142
During this period, FDA officials met with industry representatives
and specialists on research methodology to develop more rigorous testing
procedures, which was followed by an FDA sponsored conference on drug

138. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 5 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 2406
(Exhibit 273, Article by Joseph R. Hixson, Herald Tribune).
139. See Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1668–
69 (Exhibit 210) (explaining the history, past problems, current problems, and future problems in
drug testing).
140. See id. at 1688 (Exhibit 210) (posing a number of reform options as questions, including
whether the pharmaceutical industry should be asked to contribute funds to hire independent
researchers).
141. Id.
142. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 51; see also, Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 2: J. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on
Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 157 (1976) [hereinafter Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2]
(statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson, Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub.
Welfare) (summarizing the various problems in the drug industry and noting the need for reform
in clinical testing).
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testing.143 In 1970, the FDA promulgated regulations, which required drug
testing to demonstrate safety and efficacy.144
C.

1967–1979: The Nelson Hearings and Legislation

Senator Gaylord Nelson investigated clinical trials and other matters
from 1967–1979 as part of the hearings that he chaired on Competitive
Problems in the Pharmaceutical Industry.145 Individuals who testified
proposed various reforms, which included shifting the responsibility for
testing drugs to the federal government.146
During the 1968–1969 hearings, several physicians advocated for the
requirement of independent testing.147 Dr. Paul Lowinger, from the Wayne
State University School of Medicine, proposed the creation of a federal
agency, which would be funded by the federal government and/or the
pharmaceutical industry to supervise drug research.148 This federal agency
would test drugs, finance independent organizations to test drugs, or
oversee drug trials.149 Investigators would report their findings to the

143. See Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 22: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 92d Cong. 8527 (1972) [hereinafter Present Status of Competition in the
Pharm. Industry, Part 22] (statement of Charles C. Edwards, Comm’r, Food and Drug Admin.)
(explaining the various steps of progress made within the FDA and the drug testing industry to
ensure better testing procedures).
144. 21 C.F.R. § 146 (1970); see also Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry,
Part 22, supra note 143 (explaining the various changes that the FDA made to its regulations in
order to improve drug testing).
145. See generally Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Parts 1-34: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 90-96th Cong. (1967–1979)
(discussing issues related to clinical trials and other issues in the pharmaceutical industry). These
hearings, held from 1967 to 1979, are nicely summarized by two reports of the Congressional
Research Service: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 53-690 O, COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE
DRUG INDUSTRY: DRUG TESTING: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1979) [hereinafter
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY], and CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
56-036, COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY: DRUG TESTING: SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS (1972).
146. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY, supra note 145, at 68–78.
147. See id. at 68 (explaining that various physicians/advocates for reform propose
independent testing to ensure that drug testing is impartial and produces the fairest results
possible).
148. See id.; see also, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of
Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 10: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 90th-91st Cong. 3997, 4001 (1969) [hereinafter
Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10] (explaining the need for drug
testing reform and the importance of government supervision).
149. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY, supra note 145, at 68–69
(explaining that the agency would be created to supervise and approve research methods).
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agency instead of the drug sponsor.150 Dr. Dale Console, the former
medical director of E. R. Squibb & Co., supported the creation of a central
testing agency, which the federal government and pharmaceutical firms
would jointly fund, and which would select investigators to conduct drug
trials without the drug sponsors knowing their identity.151
In contrast, Dr. Franz Inglefinger, editor of the New England Journal
of Medicine, testified that independent testing, overseen by a government
agency, would reduce the risk of bias, but that it might not be worth the
cost.152 Dr. Inglefinger thought it was sufficient to require drug firms to
contract with universities to perform clinical trials.153
Dr. Donald Mainland, who coordinated research for the American
Rheumatism Association’s Cooperating Clinics Committee, argued that
drug firms could influence clinical trials when they were the intermediary
between the FDA and researchers.154 Congress, he said, should “take the
evaluation of drugs entirely out of the producer’s hands” after the
completion of animal toxicological testing.155 He favored the creation of an
independent, not-for-profit drug testing agency that would provide research
grants in a manner similar to the NIH, noting that the agency should be
funded largely by the pharmaceutical industry in a manner that did not
allow it to “influence the disposal of the money or interfere . . . with the
trials.”156
Dr. Paul Lowinger of the Wayne State University School of Medicine
proposed that Congress should create a National Institute of Pharmacology
that would “supervis[e] and approv[e] research protocols for [drug]
investigations . . . [,]” and would require drug firms to finance the clinical
trials.157 Dr. George Nichols, of Harvard Medical School, also proposed the
creation of a central agency to test drugs that drug firms and the federal

150. See id. at 69 (explaining that if results were reported to an independent agency, the
impartiality of the testing would improve).
151. See Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 11: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 91st Cong. 4478, 4481 (1969) (explaining that testing through a central
agency that is jointly funded through the government and firms would increase the impartiality
and fair results of testing).
152. Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10, supra note 148, at 4017,
4024.
153. Id. at 4017, 4025.
154. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 7: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 90th Cong. 2775, 2777 (1968).
155. Id. (noting that the federal government is called upon to direct the impartiality of testing).
156. Id. at 2768–69.
157. Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10, supra note 148, at 3997,
4001–04.
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government would jointly finance in order to eliminate “questionable
practices revolving around payment to investigators.”158 Dr. William B.
Bean, head of internal medicine at the University of Iowa College of
Medicine, supported having drug testing conducted by “a neutral judging
body, professional competent, and quite independent of any extraneous
source of financial support or any hint of obligation or connection with
the . . . promoters of the drug.”159
In 1968, NIH director Dr. James Shannon called for having a federal
agency evaluate drugs when the FDA deemed that the data it received from
manufacturers were insufficient.160 The agency would either conduct its
own studies, or contract with independent institutions.161 Conversely, Dr.
Harry Dowling, an authority on drug safety, responded that it might be
better instead for the FDA to develop an in-house capacity to evaluate
drugs.162
In 1971, Senator Nelson introduced an omnibus drug bill that would
create independent third-party drug testing.163 He summarized the problem
that the bill sought to remedy as follows:164

158. Id. at 3977, 3985.
159. Id. at 3919, 3920.
160. DOWLING, supra note 16, at 230–32.
161. Id.
162. Id. (commenting on the Shannon proposal, which was published in thei ha National
Institutes of Health, “Drug Research Reports” (1968)).
163. S. 2812, 92d Cong. (1971).
164. The bill was included as part of an omnibus drug bill, S. 2812, in the 92d Congress. It was
introduced as stand-alone legislation thereafter. Public Health Price Protection Act of 1972, S.
966, 93d Cong. (1973) (“[A bill t]o amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as
amended, to provide for the establishment of a national drug testing and evaluation center.”);
National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 1321, 94th Cong. (1975); National Drug Testing
and Evaluation Act, S. 630, 95th Cong. (1977); National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act of
1979, S. 774, 96th Cong. (1979). Senator Nelson testified that he developed his proposal with
FDA officials in 1969, while chairing the “Competitive Problems” hearings. See Preclinical &
Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 156–57. In addition to creating a system for
independent drug testing, S. 2812 would require that “in order for a new drug to be approved, it
must be demonstrated that the new drug is safer or more effective than a drug already on the
market.” 117 CONG. REC. 39,204–09 (1971) (statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson). For exposition
and discussion on Nelson’s third-party testing proposal as described in S. 966, see Examination of
the Pharmaceutical Industry: Legislation Amending the Public Health Service Act and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Parts 1, 5, 6, 7: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 966 Before
the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & the Pub. Welfare, 93d-94th Cong. (19731974). Also, see Sen. Nelson’s statement before the Kennedy subcommittee, in which he outlines
more than a decade of statements by the FDA indicating that the problems of fraud and poorly
designed studies were a problem of the past, and that stronger monitoring and inspections have
eliminated the problem, which is available at Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2,
supra note 142, at 156–60.
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the FDA determines the safety and efficacy of a drug solely
on the basis of information supplied by the drug company
making the application. The dangers involved in the
dependence on drug firms to perform, direct, or arrange for
the testing of drugs in which they have a financial interest
is obvious . . . . [T]here is an inevitable tendency—no
matter how conscientious the firm—to emphasize the
positive features and deemphasize the negative. Many of
the people they engage to do their testing are equally
anxious to secure additional contracts for drug testing . . . A
physician who turns in unfavorable reports on the drugs he
is testing may not have his contract renewed . . . . [S]ome
firms have been guilty of misrepresenting, distorting, and
even withholding information developed in their testing of
drugs which may in any way retard or prevent an approval
to market. Injury and death have resulted from such
actions . . . . Testing of drugs should be done by specialists
who have no direct relationship with the manufacturer, who
cannot benefit financially from the results, [and] who are
not motivated even subconsciously by the desire to get
anything but the truth.165
Senator Nelson introduced the omnibus bill again in 1973, and
sponsored stand-alone bills for independent drug testing in each Congress
until he lost his re-election bid in 1980.166
The Nelson bill vested the federal government with responsibility for
all testing of NDA and FDA drug reviews.167 The Nelson bill also
authorized the creation of a National Drug Testing and Evaluation Center
within the FDA to oversee clinical investigations of new drugs, which
meant that the federal government would perform the tests either through

165. CONG. REC., supra note 164; see also Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2,
supra note 142, at 156 (Sen. Nelson explaining several years later that the current system was
“inherently defective in that the promoter and beneficiary of the product which needs to be
licensed and marketed controls all the studies that are made to prove its safety and its efficacy”).
166. Public Health Price Protection Act of 1972, S. 966, 93d Cong. (1973); National Drug
Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 1321, 94th Cong. (1975); National Drug Testing and Evaluation
Act, S. 630, 95th Cong. (1977); National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act of 1979, S. 774, 96th
Cong. (1979). See also Gaylord Nelson, DISCOVER THE NETWORKS: A GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL
LEFT, http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/individualProfile.asp?indid=1861 (last visited Nov. 7,
2014) (detailing the political career of Senator Gaylord Nelson and his work while in office).
167. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 1: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 966 §
102 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. 55–56
(1973) (examining the text of S. 966, 93d Cong. § 102 (1973)).
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the testing center, or by contracting with independent organizations.168 The
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”)
would decide whether each drug would be tested through the national
testing center or an independent organization.169 Drug companies would
finance the testing center and the clinical trials by paying into a common
fund, which the Secretary of HEW would draw from to pay for testing.170
The Secretary would publicize the “methodology, results, and
conclusions.”171 Drug sponsors could still conduct their own clinical trials,
but they were subject to HEW regulations and public disclosure of the
testing methods and results.172
D.

1973–1980: The Kennedy Hearings

Senator Ted Kennedy chaired hearings entitled “Examination of the
Pharmaceutical Industry” in 1973–1974,173 as well as hearings entitled
“Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry” from
1975–1979.174 Kennedy also examined the Nelson proposal for
independent drug testing, among other issues.175
At the hearings in 1974 and 1976, which were held during the
presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Charles Edwards (HEW
Assistant Secretary for Health) and Alexander Schmidt (FDA
Commissioner) opposed Senator Nelson’s proposed national drug-testing
center.176 Commissioner Schmidt argued that economic incentives and tort
168. Id. at 56–57.
169. Id. at 55–56.
170. Id. at 55.
171. Id. at 63 (text of S. 966, 93d Cong. §102 (1973)).
172. Id.
173. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry: Legislation Amending the Public Health
Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7: Hearings on
S. 3441 and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & the Pub. Welfare,
93d-94th Cong. (1973–1974).
174. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 1–3: J. Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975–1976);
Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Parts 4–5: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health & Scientific Research of the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. (1977–
1978); Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health & Scientific Research of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 96th Cong.
(1979) [hereinafter Preclinical & Clinical Testing (1979)].
175. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 161.
176. See Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 5: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 966
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. 2162
(1974) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5] (opposing the proposal for a
National Drug-Testing center); Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at
160 (proposing instead a progressive series of steps to evaluate and reform the existing system).
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liability created an incentive for drug firms to carry out proper studies,177
and that the “professional integrity of toxicologists in the industry” helped
to assure high quality investigations.178 Commissioner Schmidt noted that
having the federal government or independent labs perform the work would
not necessarily improve the quality of testing. 179 Furthermore,
Commissioner Schmidt announced that the FDA would create regulations
to assure “good laboratory practice[s]” in animal testing, would inspect
animal testing facilities, and would audit or review any data where there
was suspicion of falsification.180
Commissioner Schmidt also reported that the FDA had rejected the
idea of drug testing under federal auspices,181 as it was not feasible in the
short term since the federal government lacked sufficient personnel and
testing facilities.182 Moreover, due to the dearth of independent
laboratories, it was not possible to have independent third parties perform
the tests.183 Schmidt also argued that it would be too costly to have the
federal government test drugs, as “there is no way that we can get the
resources to put into this that drug companies do.”184 Furthermore, Schmidt
argued that he believed “all monopolies, whether public or private, tend to
stagnate, [so] the prospect of any single institution gaining such control
over all preclinical drug investigation troubles me.”185
Both Commissioner Schmidt and HEW Assistant Secretary Edwards
testified that having the FDA engage in or select firms to perform drug
testing would mire the FDA in conflicting roles because the FDA would

177. See Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5, supra note 176, at 2163 (statement of
Alexander Schmidt, FDA Comm’r) (“Senator, you are assuming that we could do it better than
industry, and I have some disagreement with that. I think the problem is not the system per se, but
in the monitoring that we carry on of the system. We have underway at FDA, and have had for a
couple of years an improved surveillance system of these clinical investigations that are being
carried on behalf of the manufacturer. There is nothing wrong with the system. It is good, but we
have over the years done a very poor job of surveillance, if you will, but I think first of all there is
not enough talent to go around in terms of having the drug industry involved in clinical testing
along with the Federal Government.”). See also Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2,
supra note 142, at 92–93 (statement of Alexander Schmidt, FDA Comm’r) (discussing economic
incentives, such as the pharmaceutical industry’s practice of cross-checking data with competitors,
and liability implications stemming from marketing an unsafe product).
178. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 45.
179. Id. at 103–04.
180. Id. at 47–48.
181. Id. at 103–04.
182. Id. at 104.
183. See id. (discussing challenges presented by the insufficiency of independent laboratories
in number and capacity to handle large numbers of studies).
184. Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5, supra note 176, at 2164–65.
185. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 103.
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ultimately evaluate the research performed under its aegis.186 Edwards
contended that “the public would be deprived of . . . FDA impartial review
of clinical data.”187 Commissioner Schmidt claimed that all that was needed
to ensure reliable trials was increased FDA oversight that is supported by
FDA authority to issue subpoenas, examine records, and conduct
investigations.188 Edwards rebutted, however, with the opinion that a
government center would not necessarily do a better job of testing than drug
firms, and that industry bias could be countered through increased
government surveillance.189
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“PMA”) and the
AMA both opposed the creation of a national drug testing and evaluation
center.190 PMA president, Joseph Stetler, argued that the proposal
incorrectly assumed “that scientists will somehow be more objective if their
work is done under government rather than private aegis,”191 and that
creating the center would lead to a “drastic slowing down of drug
research.”192 Speaking for the AMA, Dr. James Sammons argued that
creating an FDA drug testing center would transform the FDA from a judge
of research that was conducted by others into an organization that judged its
own research.193
Meanwhile, further investigations and hearings found that many
clinical trials did not comply with legal requirements or research norms.194
The FDA investigations of G. D. Searle in the early 1970s revealed poor
oversight, negligence, and fraud in the firm’s toxicological drug testing.195
186. Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5, supra note 176, at 2163–65 (statement of
Charles C. Edwards, Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare).
187. Id. at 2163.
188. Id. at 2164–65.
189. Id. at 2163 (“There is nothing wrong with the system. . . . [B]ut we have . . . done a very
poor job of surveillance . . . .”).
190. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 6: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 966
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 2419,
2535 (1974) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 6].
191. Id. at 2526.
192. Id. at 2494.
193. Id. at 2545, 2572–73 (statement of James H. Sammons, Executive Vice President
Designate, American Medical Association). Both the PMA and AMA opposed another aspect of
the proposal: the idea that drug trials should compare the effectiveness of new drugs to those on
the market, and that the FDA should consider comparative effectiveness when deciding whether to
authorize the sale of a new drug. Id.
194. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 337–39.
195. See id. at 24–42 (memorandum from Searle Investigation Task Force to Searle
Investigation Steering Committee) (showing the results of the investigation dealing with the
integrity of animal data, which G. D. Searle & Co. submitted to the FDA in support of the safety
of its products, and highlighting issues such as inadequate training, delayed necropsy of animals,
and unexplained alterations in records).
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The FDA found “a pattern of conduct[,] which compromises the scientific
integrity of the studies.”196 At the 1976 hearings, Gregory J. Ahart reported
that a Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) investigation concluded
that there is “a lack of assurance that the data . . . upon which FDA bases its
decision to approve a new drug . . . is accurate and reliable.”197
Subsequently, the FDA developed regulations for Good Laboratory
Practices (“GLP”),198 and introduced bio-research monitoring and
inspection.199 A 1977 study found poor compliance with these standards;200
by 1979, however, compliance had risen to 88%.201
Congressional testimony in 1976 made clear that there were then two
types of problems with drug testing: first, manufacturers’ bias compromised
impartiality, and second, cost pressures led organizations to perform poor

196. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 3: Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on
Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 4 (1976) [hereinafter
Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3]. An FDA survey of 155 clinical investigators
between 1972 and 1974 found that 74% did not comply with one or more legal requirements, 28%
did not adhere to the study protocol, 23% did not keep accurate records of the patients' condition
before, during, and after trial, and 22% did not retain case records. Preclinical & Clinical Testing
Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 340.
197. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 335. Specifically, Mr.
Ahart made the following points regarding the GAO’s findings. Before 1974, there was no
comprehensive monitoring plan. Since 1972, when the FDA began a special survey of clinical
investigators, it found that most clinical investigators were not fully compliant, and that most
sponsors were not adequately monitoring their investigators. Id. at 364–65. In a survey conducted
from 1972–74, the FDA found significant (74%) noncompliance with a number of requirements.
Id. at 365. It identified failure in: obtaining patient consent—35%; keeping accurate records of the
amount of drugs received from sponsors and distributed to subjects—50%; adhering to study
protocol—28%; maintaining accurate records reflecting the condition of the patient before, during,
and after the study, and the nature of the laboratory work done and other therapy administered
during the study—23%; retaining case records as required—22%; and properly supervising the
study—12%. Id. FDA inspections of sample groups of clinical investigations under the Bureau of
Drugs, the Bureau of Biologics, and of federally sponsored clinical investigations all reviewed the
same types of deficiencies. Id. at 366–67. The FDA did develop a “comprehensive plan for
clinical investigation evaluation” in 1975 that was intended to enhance/remedy the monitoring
efforts, but as of January 1976, it was not yet fully implemented. The FDA made only sparing use
of its enforcement tools to improve clinical investigations. In the period following the ‘62
amendments, there were only two criminal prosecutions, regulatory letters have been used only
once by the Bureau of Biologics and not at all by the Bureau of Drugs, and the two bureaus
combined disqualified only 30 investigators. Id. at 368–69.
198. Good Laboratory Practice for Nonclinical Laboratory Studies, 21 C.F.R. § 58 (2011).
199. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CHAPTER 48–BIORESEARCH MONITORING,
COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM
GUIDANCE
MANUAL
(2001),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/EnforcementActions/BioresearchMonitoring/ucm133765.p
df (providing guidance for nonclinical laboratories on compliance with Good Laboratory Practice
requirements).
200. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 82–83.
201. See MARCEL DEKKER, INC., GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE REGULATIONS 35 (Sandy
Weinberg ed., 3d ed. 2003).
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quality work.202 Having a governmental agency rather than the
manufacturer select the organization that performs the tests would eliminate
bias.203 Other measures were needed, however, to control for poor quality
work due to economic pressures.204 Officials from the National Cancer
Institute described the procedures that they used to ensure that testing by
outside firms was of high quality.205 Dr. Sidney Wolfe of the Public
Citizen’s Health Research Group (“HRG”) argued that “what we learn . . .
is not to allow any more testing by industry or by companies, who owe their
allegiance to industry,” further explaining that “no kind of surveillance of
any kind over conflicted and inadequate data is going to improve the quality
of it.”206
In 1978, Senator Kennedy renewed his hearings, and testimony and
documents revealed continued negligence, fraud, and fabrication of data.207
Another theme that the hearings explored concerned the dependence of
toxicological laboratories on drug firms for their continued operation.208
Would the toxicological laboratories’ dependence induce these labs to
engage in fraud due to fear that the drug firms would not renew the labs’
contract if they reported unfavorable results? Some witnesses suggested that
202. See generally Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 14
(statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on
Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary) (“Many decisions made in the course of designing, conducting and reporting studies
tended to minimize the chances of discovering toxicity and to allay possible FDA concern.”);
Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 196, at 13 (statement of Alexander
Schmidt, FDA Comm’r) (discussing various lapses in integrity, including instances where
employees of laboratory subcontractors “were instructed to falsify data by their employer”).
203. See infra Part III.A (addressing objections to independent testing).
204. See infra Part III.B (discussing approaches to eliminate economic pressures and conflicts
of interests for research organizations selected by the federal government).
205. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 147–55
(testimony of Frank J. Rauscher, Jr., Director, National Cancer Institute); see also BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 85, at 104–06 (summarizing Dr. Schmidt’s testimony, which reviews the points
covered by Dr. Rauscher).
206. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 196, at 691 (statement of Dr.
Sidney Wolfe, Public Citizens Health Research Group).
207. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 5: Hearings on
Examination of The Process of Drug Testing and FDA’s Role in the Regulation and Conditions
Under Which Such Testing is Carried Out Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research
of the Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 7–8 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy)
(discussing case reports on “fictitious subjects, and on subjects who were never administered the
investigational drug they were supposed to have received,” and case reports “containing the
results of clinical laboratory work which was not actually performed”).
208. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 139 (statement of
John R. Quarles, Deputy Administrator of the EPA) (“[A] laboratory might be so dependent upon
a pesticide producer for contract work that its independent scientific judgment could be impaired
by the close economic relationship.”). See also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 80 (“One of the
issues raised by the Searle investigations was the relationship between contract laboratories and
large pharmaceutical companies.”).
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drug firms instructed laboratories to fabricate data, a practice called “drylabeling.”209 Other witnesses and senators expressed concern that drug
testers either failed to record data, or that drug testers fabricated data as a
means to ensure that manufacturers would continue to employ them.210
E.

The Carter Administration Report on New Drug Regulation

During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the Department
of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) Review Panel on New Drug
Regulation concluded that the current system was flawed since the “FDA
must rely almost exclusively on the accuracy and objectivity of industrygenerated data[,] . . . [and b]ecause the company has a financial interest in
successful test results, the present drug testing system contains an inherent
bias.”211 The review panel explained that “[t]he most direct means of
minimizing the bias in testing is to have research conducted by investigators
who are financially independent of the drug sponsor.”212 The panel noted
that the disadvantage of having the federal government conduct clinical
trials was that “[i]f such testing were undertaken by the FDA, the agency
would be in the untenable position of passing upon the result of its own
research.”213 The panel, therefore, preferred a system under which “the
government would be responsible for hiring and paying independent
researchers, with the cost of research assessed to the sponsor,” and where
“[t]he information produced would be given to both the pharmaceutical
sponsor and the FDA for analysis.”214

209. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 196, at 13 (statement of
Alexander Schmidt, FDA Comm’r) (noting that “[s]ome of the laboratory determinations alleged
to have been carried out were found by the FDA investigators not to been carried out at all,”
otherwise “called ‘dry-labeling’ by some,” which means “[t]hat data sheets are simply filled out
by individuals who know the range of values to submit, and put out the data sheets”);
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 80 (“[Can] pharmaceutical companies use their commercial
power to impose a set of expectations on contract laboratories whereby unfavorable results cause
the laboratory to believe that it will be unlikely to get future contracts?”).
210. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 139–42, 158–59
(noting that drug companies concealed information and made falsified statements to the FDA, and
there are problems when self-interested industries control the studies).
211. NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE
REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION 83 (1977).
212. Id. at 85–86.
213. Id. at 88.
214. Id. at 89.
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The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978

In 1978, the FDA and HEW supported the Drug Regulation Reform
Act of 1978, sponsored by Senator Kennedy and nine other senators.215 The
bill would have reformed the drug review process, and created some
governmental capacity to evaluate drugs.216 The bill also would have
increased the FDA’s role in overseeing the design and implementation of
testing protocols, while requiring increased disclosure of clinical trial
data.217
The bill proposed a “National Center for Clinical Pharmacology” to
conduct some intramural public clinical pharmacology research.218 The
Center’s functions consisted of “conduct[ing] and support[ing] research in
clinical pharmacology and clinical pharmacy, including investigations for:
(1) the safety and effectiveness of existing and new uses of drug products,
(2) the development of drug products for diseases and other conditions of
low incidence, [and] (3) drug products of special significance or with
respect to which there is substantial controversy as to safety and
effectiveness.”219 The pharmaceutical industry, physicians, and some
consumer advocates opposed the reform, and as a result, the bill was never
reported out of the committee.220
215. 124 CONG. REC. 2,755 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (indicating nine
co-sponsors: Cranston, Eagleton, Hathaway, Javits, Nelson, Pell, Randolph, Riegle, and
Williams).
216. See JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DRUG REGULATION
REFORM ACT OF 1978 SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS i–viii (1978) (indicating subparts of the
bill governing approval of drug entities and drug products and noting the requirements for:
dispensing, labeling, distribution, licensing, manufacturing, components, packaging, registration,
investigation, exporting, practitioners, and standards for safety).
217. See id. at 97 (“Subsection (f) establishes the requirements for the conduct of a drug
innovation investigation [including] (1) confining distribution of the drug to experts qualified to
investigate the drug or the disease under [the] study; (2) preventing the drug from being dispensed
by investigators other than those specified to conduct the investigation; (3) conducting the
investigation in accordance with the protocol submitted in the registration; (4) maintaining
records, and submitting reports to the Secretary, regarding the investigation so that the Secretary
may determine whether the conditions of registration are being fulfilled; (5) reporting to the
Secretary information of newly discovered risks so that the Secretary may determine whether
participants are being subjected to an unreasonable and significant risk of illness or injury; (6)
complying with the requirements in section 130 regarding protection of human subjects in
research; and (7) not promoting or commercializing the drug product.”).
218. See id. at 193–94 (noting that § 201 “amends the Public Health Service Act by . . .
establish[ing] a National Center for Clinical Pharmacology. . . . [and] authoriz[ing] the Center to
conduct and support research in clinical pharmacology . . . ”).
219. Id.
220. See Oversight: The Food and Drug Administration’s Process for Approving New Drugs:
Hearings on H.R. 37 Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Research, & Tech. of the Comm. on Sci. &
Tech., 96th Cong. 315, 317, 389, 419, 564–65 (1979) (noting that the President of the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association on the Drug Approval Process of the FDA rejected the
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Senator Kennedy’s 1979 hearings documented continued problems
with research fraud,221 and FDA audits also revealed continued fraud and
flawed research.222 In the 1980 election where Ronald Reagan was elected
President, Senator Gaylord Nelson lost his bid for re-election, and the
Senate majority shifted from the Democratic Party to the Republican
Party.223 These changes ended the congressional proposals for independent
drug testing.224 Discussion of independent drug testing in medical and
popular journals then virtually ceased until the 1990s.
III.
A.

REVISITING PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING
Assessing the Arguments Against Independent Drug Testing

In the 1960s and 1970s, opponents argued that independent drug
testing was not feasible because there were insufficient independent private
organizations to conduct toxicological tests and clinical trials, and
additionally argued that the federal government lacked the capacity to
perform this work.225 These assertions assumed that private firms and the
federal government could not expand their capacities to meet new
demands.226

reform, that Dr. Moulton, advocate for the National Consumer League, disagreed with FDA
reform, and that the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 failed to secure congressional
approval). See also H.R. 12980 (95th): Drug Regulation Reform Act, GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/95/hr12980 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (“This bill was
introduced on June 5, 1978, in a previous session of Congress, but was not enacted.”).
221. Preclinical & Clinical Testing, (1979), supra note 174, at 12–13 (statement of Sherwin
Gardner, Deputy Comm’r, FDA).
222. See id. at 10 (noting that the FDA “[found] a number of investigators whose work
represents sloppy science, disregard for the rights of test subjects, and misrepresentation of test
data”).
223. See Peter Temin, Government Actions in Times of Crisis: Lessons from the History of
Drug Regulation, 18 J. SOC. HIST. 433, 437 (noting that Ronald Regan was elected and the
Democrats lost the Sentate); Demetrios Caraley, Do Congressional Liberals Really Need to
Tremble? A Quick Look at Some Hard Data, 96 POL. SCI. Q. 27, 28 (1981) (noting that Gaylord
Nelson lost in the Senate).
224. See Stuart J. Land, Current Issues Relating to FDA Regulation of New Drugs, 38 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 29, 29–34 (1983) (“In a period of deregulation [and d]uring a time of personnel
reductions,” “the present policy is chilling the publication of clinical research results,” as
“progress is slow in the OTC Drug Review. . . . [T]he pace is glacier-like.”).
225. See, e.g., Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 81, at 1053, 1060–
61, 1261 (noting that a study for toxicological drug testing shows that drug testing is too complex,
timely, costly, and energy-consuming, so it should be sufficient to have briefer and less thorough
investigations; additionally, while the FDA needs greater competency, a national organization for
the objective evaluation of drugs is not an easily attained goal).
226. See id. at 1041, 1060–61 (“Assuming the majority still believe[s] our Government should
do only what cannot be, or is not, done by private agencies, the present situation and probable
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The opponent’s arguments were probably not correct then, and the
arguments are certainly not true now. Today, rather than test drugs inhouse, manufacturers contract out this work.227 Initially, universities
performed most of this research, but over the last quarter century, drug
firms shifted most of their clinical trials to for-profit CROs, which now
constitutes a global industry.228 Yet, testing by third parties still is not
independent today.229 Manufacturers either design the clinical trial or direct
and oversee the researchers who do, and manufacturers also select the
organization that conducts the research.230 Researchers, whether in CROs
or universities, depend on the drug manufacturer for their income and must
follow the manufacturer’s directions if they want to receive continued
funding.231
Public policy could promote the independence of existing contract
research organizations and universities if a governmental agency selected
both the entity that performed the clinical trials and monitored its work.232
Furthermore, by allocating funds for the research, the agency could spur the
growth of organizations with high standards for integrity, quality, and
independence.233 For example, the internationally recognized Mario Negri
Pharmacological Institute has performed independent clinical trials in
Europe for nearly 50 years, has published more than 13,000 original
scientific papers in scientific journals, and now conducts about 80 clinical
trials a year.234

trends seem to call for a magnitude of resources and effort far beyond the capacities of any
combination of private enterprises.”).
227. See Maysoun D. Masri et al., Contract Research Organizations: An Industry Analysis 5
INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICAL HEALTHCARE MARKETING 2, 5 (2007) (noting that pharmaceutical
and biotechnology manufacturers utilize CROs more and more to conduct research endeavors at a
greater speed and less cost).
228. See id. at 12–13, 18 (noting a clear shift toward globalization of clinical trials); Richard A.
Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research, 19 HEALTH AFF. 129, 141 (2000) (noting a shift
to CROs).
229. See Rettig, supra note 228, at 134 (noting that some firms manage their own trials, with
most employing a hybrid form of internally and outsourced management, while drug firms usually
recruit for and design trials followed by a NDA submission to the FDA).
230. Id.
231. See Jill A. Fisher & Corey A. Kalbaugh, United States Private-Sector Physicians and
Pharmaceutical Contract Research: A Qualitative Study, 9 PLOS MED. 2, 4–6 (2012) (noting that
sponsoring companies influence physicians’ opinions and decisions through financial pressures).
232. See supra Part III.A (providing a solution to sever the CROs and universities’ reliance on
a manufacturer’s directions).
233. See supra Part III.A (explaining how public policy separates the CROs and universities’
dependence on a manufacturer’s income and direction).
234. See MARIO NEGI INST. FOR PHARMACOLOGICAL RES., http://www.marionegri.it/mn/en
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (describing the Institute as a “not-for-profit biomedical research
organization. . . . [that] started work in Milan on 1 February 1963. . . . and ‘has published more
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Independent testing, its opponents also argued, would not ensure that
clinical trials were well designed or conducted competently.235 Even if a
governmental agency selected the researchers, the researchers might
perform sloppy work or engage in fraud.236 No doubt, independent testing
alone is not sufficient to ensure accurate results.237 Nevertheless,
independent testing eliminates the biggest problem: bias.238 Moreover, the
National Cancer Institute’s experience in contracting with laboratories to
test chemicals demonstrates that regulators can monitor and control the
quality of contracted testing.239
Opponents also claimed that having the federal government test drugs
would mire the FDA in conflicts of interest because the government would
both conduct clinical trials and also evaluate those trials when deciding
whether or not to approve drugs.240 There is irony in opposing government
drug testing as a means to avoid conflicts of interest. The rationale for
government-sponsored testing is to remove the conflict of interest that is
present when a firm evaluates its products.241 The issue, therefore, is
whether government-sponsored testing would result in evaluations that
were more or less biased than when a manufacturer tested its own products.
Drug manufactures have a systematic bias in favor of their products,242
while governmental agencies do not have a bias in favor of or against any
particular product.243 Certainly, some individual governmental personnel
might harbor a bias towards a firm or a product, but that would not
systematically slant all testing.244

than 10,000 articles in prestigious international scientific journals and several books and congress
proceedings’”).
235. See Masri et al., supra note 227, at 2, 19 (noting that clinical trials present concerns of
accuracy, quality, ethics, and safety).
236. See, e.g., Rettig, supra note 228, at 130 (noting that the FDA halted FDA-regulated trials
at the University of Colorado that were not reviewed by its IRB within the prior year).
237. See id. at 142 (noting concerns of suppression of research results by drug firms, bias in
interpreting inconclusive research, and ghost authorship of articles).
238. See Joel Lexchin, Those Who Have the Gold Make the Evidence: How the
Pharmaceutical Industry Biases the Outcomes of Clinical Trials of Medications, 18 SCI. &
ENGINEERING ETHICS 248, 257 (2012) (noting that bias could be reduced if the industry left the
planning and monitoring of the research design in the hands of the researchers).
239. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 144.
240. See supra text accompanying note 186.
241. See supra text accompanying note 206.
242. See supra text accompanying note 2.
243. See supra text accompanying note 241.
244. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR CLINIC TRIAL SPONSORS,
ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA MONITORING COMMITTEES 7
(2006) (highlighting how the current use of separate adjudication committees in clinical trials
ensure data that is as accurate and bias-free as possible).
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It is easy to avoid bias if a government agency evaluated the quality
and results of its own work by simply having one government agency
perform the clinical trials, and a separate and independent agency
evaluating those trials.245 In fact, government agencies frequently evaluate
the work of other government programs.246 For example, the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”), an independent agency, evaluates the
performance of federal programs.247 GAO reports are a model of objective
evaluation, and are highly regarded.248 It is also possible for the FDA to
avoid evaluating any work performed by governmental employees or
programs by having the NIH select independent contractors, who would
then perform the clinical trials.249 Then the FDA would evaluate the
research performed in the private sector, just as it does today.250 The key
difference would be that the researchers would not be dependent on,
influenced by, or chosen by the drug sponsor.
Currently, it requires about 15 years from the beginning of drug
development until a drug can be marketed.251 Phase I clinical trials in
humans take about a year and a half, Phase II clinical trials typically take
two years, and Phase III clinical trials take three to five years.252 Opponents
of independent testing also claim that independent testing would slow the

245. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 244 (indicating that the current
use of distinct adjudication committees in clinical trials is a successful mode of bias elimination).
246. See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452
(Feb. 22, 2002) (explaining that Congress directed the Office of Management and Budget to issue
guidelines for governmental agencies that ensure quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information, and to require that these agencies implement administrative mechanisms permitting
access to information about non-compliance with these guidelines).
247. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-5SP, SUMMARY OF GAO’S
PERFORMANCE
AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587949.pdf (describing the GAO’s duties as including the
examination of public funds, evaluating federal programs and policies, and providing analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed decisions).
248. See id. at i (highlighting the integrity aspect of the agency by stating that they take an
“objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced approach” to all of their
activities); see also Noah B. Bleicher et al., Accountability in Indefinite-Delivery/IndefiniteQuantity Contracting: The Multifaceted Work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 37
PUB. CONT. L.J. 375, 413 (2008) (acknowledging the GAO’s ability to provide objective,
balanced analyses in the ID/IQ contracting field).
249. See ANGELL, supra note 3, at 245.
250. See id. (proposing having the FDA shift the responsibility for the conduct of clinical trials
from sponsors to independent researchers and their institutions).
251. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 13 (providing a graph showing that the entire
pharmaceutical drug process takes an average of 15 years from the inception of drug development
to market approval).
252. Id. at 9–11.
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introduction of new drugs,253 but this assertion is unpersuasive.
Independent testing is unlikely to cause much delay because there is no
reason that researchers chosen by the NIH should perform work more
slowly than researchers chosen by a pharmaceutical firm. It might take a
governmental agency longer than a drug firm to select which researchers to
employ, but not much.254 If it takes more time in developing the research
protocol to ensure that clinical trials are better designed and
methodologically sound, then that would be time well spent. Moreover,
there are ways to take care of the problems that any delay would cause for
manufacturers.255 The Hatch-Waxman Act already extends for up to five
years the period of market exclusivity that manufacturers of new drugs
receive, which compensates manufacturers for part of the time that it takes
them to conduct clinical trials and for the FDA to review NDAs.256
Regulations could increase the period of market exclusivity in order to
account for any increased time taken to conduct clinical trials using the new
process.
B.

Controlling Conflicts of Interests of Research Organizations
Engaged by the Government

Having a government agency select the private organization that
conducts clinical trials would not necessarily remove all conflicts of
interest. There exists potential bias if the researchers with which the federal
government contracted with depended on drug manufacturers for most of
their research income.257 The manufacturer could cease to employ the
researchers in the future, or retaliate in other ways if the researchers
produced negative evaluations of the manufacturer’s products for

253. See Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 6, supra note 190, at 2494 (criticizing an
independent National Drug Testing and Evaluation Center because the drug progress would
diminish since new products could not be approved unless it had a “significantly greater safety
effectiveness” than current market-approved drugs).
254. Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10, supra note 148, at 4025
(statement of Dr. Franz Ingelfinger, editor of the New England Journal of Medicine) (arguing that
a study with a potentially large financial gain would take time to pick from an extensive list of
independent investigators, while a relatively dull study would also cause delay since it will be
difficult to interest good researchers).
255. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2012) (providing extensions for patents that were subject
to regulatory review before they were commercially marketed).
256. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1602 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 35 U.S.C.).
257. See Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81, at 13934.

82

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 18:45

government-sponsored testing.258 Additionally, the risk of losing contracts
from drug manufacturers could bias the evaluations of researchers.
The most effective way to address this problem is to prohibit all firms
and organizations that accept federal contracts for drug evaluation from
performing any direct work for drug manufacturers. Fewer research
organizations could thrive without doing any work for drug firms, however,
and adopting this rule would reduce the pool of organizations willing to
accept federal drug contracts;259 this might make it difficult for the federal
government to find research organizations capable of performing high
quality work.
An alternative strategy is to reduce the degree of financial dependence
rather than eliminating it entirely. The agency awarding drug evaluation
contracts could offer work only to CROs or universities that earned 40% or
less of their research revenue from drug manufacturers. Regulations could
also direct the agency to give preference in awarding contracts to well
qualified organizations that received 10% or less of their revenue from drug
manufacturers.
To further reduce the risk of bias while improving the quality of
clinical trials, the federal government could also contract with experts to
evaluate the proposed research design and protocol before authorizing the
start of the clinical trial. It makes sense to require public disclosure of the
proposed research protocol and the review of experts that evaluated it, and
to allow the public to comment on the proposed research protocol. Based on
the expert evaluation and public comments, the government agency could
ask the research organization to revise its trial design and research protocol
as needed.
C.

Begin Independent Testing With New Drugs

We can distinguish among three categories of drug trials: (1) those
used to support NDAs; (2) post-marketing trials required by the FDA as a

258. This sort of conflict of interest also occurs when independent medical review
organizations evaluate decisions of insurers to deny medical services. Even when public
authorities select the review organization, the review organizations often depend on the insurer
whose decisions they assess. Typically, these review organizations earn much of their income
from performing other work for insurers. Insurers that are displeased with a decision of an
independent review organization can select another organization to employ for this work. See
Marc A. Rodwin, New Standards for Medical Review Organizations: Holding Them and Health
Plans Accountable for Their Decisions, 30 HEALTH AFF. 519, 519–20 (2011).
259. See Bekelman et al., supra note 12 (stating that approximately one-fourth of biomedical
researchers at academic institutions receive funding from the drug industry, one-third of lead
authors in published articles have financial interests, and two-thirds of academic institutions have
financial interests in businesses that sponsor their faculty research).
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condition for granting marketing approval; and (3) other post-marketing
approval trials not required by the FDA.260 Independent testing should start
with clinical trials to support NDAs.261
Federal law already requires that drug companies submit evidence on
drug safety and effectiveness, and to specify how to conduct these trials
when the drug companies seek approval to market a new drug.262 The FDA
probably then has authority to promulgate regulations that require that such
clinical trials be designed and conducted by an independent organization
that is selected and supervised by a federal agency. Congress also could
create this requirement by amending the FDCA, and firms would have to
comply because with legislative change, they would have no alternative.
The FDA also has jurisdiction over certain post-marketing trials
because regulations require that manufacturers monitor the risks of drugs
that they market, and that manufacturers submit results from their postmarketing trials to the FDA.263 Sometimes the FDA specifies the kind of
post-marketing trials that a drug manufacturer must perform, particularly if
the NDA revealed potential serious drug risks.264 The FDA or Congress
could require that drug firms finance independent clinical trials for those
post-marketing studies. It is hard for the FDA to ensure that drug firms
complete post-marketing studies because the FDA lacks the ability to
routinely stop a manufacturer from marketing an approved drug.265 In
contrast, regulatory authorities in the European Union have such power

260. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2012) (indicating that the FDA requires premarketing strategies in
addition to post-marketing strategies for an already approved drug if new safety information
surfaces and the strategy is necessary to make sure the benefits of the product outweigh the risks).
See also Lance L. Shea et al., Cause and Effect? Assessing Postmarketing Safety Studies As
Evidence of Causation in Products Liability Cases, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 447 (2007) (stating
that the FDA can request, without compelling by regulation, a sponsor to conduct post-marketing
studies indicating that there are trials being conducted that are not FDA required).
261. See Finnuala Kelleher, The Pharmaceutical Industry's Responsibility for Protecting
Human Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 84
(2004) (indicating that current Institutional Review Boards have no external review after pre-trial
protocol approval, and are not independent of the institutions they are reviewing, leading to a lack
of accountability).
262. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012).
263. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2012).
264. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80–.81 (2001).
265. Until enactment of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, the FDA
lacked the authority to compel drug firms to conduct post-marketing studies of approved drugs.
See Peter Chang, Reauthorization of Pdufa: An Exercise in Post-Market Drug Safety Reform, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 196, 197 (2008). Drug firms often did not complete or delayed conducting
these studies. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PUB’L NO.
OEI-01-04-00390, FDA'S MONITORING OF POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS 11 (2006),
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-04-00390.pdf. See also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 55,
155–57 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., The National Academies Press 2007).
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because authorization to market a new drug expires after five years unless
the European Medicine Agency approves a renewal application.266
Therefore, the FDA would need Congress to grant the FDA new powers,
which would be similar to the regulatory authorities in the European Union
in order to ensure that firms carried out these trials.
Drug firms also conduct clinical trials for approved drugs that are not
required by the FDA, and will often compare the efficacy of one drug to
another to help market their products.267 It will be much harder to require
these trials to be independently conducted, because manufacturers are not
required to conduct these clinical trials and they therefore have the option of
not funding such clinical trials.268 If Congress wants independent clinical
trials to evaluate the comparative efficacy of approved drugs, then Congress
will probably need to finance these studies. In the end, the best solution is
for Congress to pass legislation that requires manufacturers to submit such
data to the FDA, which would then give the FDA jurisdiction over such
research.

266. Commission Regulation 726/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 35.
267. Service of U.S. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Learn About Clinical Studies,
CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-studies/learn#ClinicalTrials (last
reviewed Aug. 2012) (stating that some clinical trials compare new medical approaches to a
standard one, or compare interventions that are already available to each other).
268. See Shea et al., supra note 260.

